International Dialogue
Volume 6

Article 18

11-2016

Civics Beyond Critics: Character Education in a Liberal Democracy
Eric R. Boot

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/id-journal
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, International and Area Studies Commons,
International and Intercultural Communication Commons, International Relations Commons, and the
Political Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Boot, Eric R. (2016) "Civics Beyond Critics: Character Education in a Liberal Democracy," International
Dialogue: Vol. 6, Article 18.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32873/uno.dc.ID.6.1.1132
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/id-journal/vol6/iss1/18

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the The Goldstein Center for Human Rights at
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in International Dialogue by an authorized editor
of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

ID: International Dialogue, A Multidisciplinary Journal of World Affairs 6 2016

Review
Civics Beyond Critics: Character Education in a
Liberal Democracy
Ian MacMullen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 275pp.

Eric R.Boot*
It is quite common to make the argument that a stable liberal democracy requires high
levels of compliance with the law. Scholars disagree, however, how such reliable and
widespread compliance can be achieved. Roughly, liberals have traditionally emphasized
the importance of arriving at compliance by way of autonomous and critical reasoning,
whereas others (communitarians and republicans chiefly) argue that autonomous motives
are notoriously weak and can, therefore, not by themselves bring about a high enough
rate of compliance. The exclusionary importance accorded to autonomy by (many)
liberals bars the state from cultivating the habits, sentiments and civic virtue upon which
a polity’s stability depends. By contrast, many republicans follow Rousseau when he
states that it is necessary for the law to reach the citizens’ hearts: “So long as the
legislative force does not reach that deep, the laws will invariably be evaded” (Rousseau
1997: 179). We ought to, in other words, acknowledge the importance of nonautonomous
motives for compliance stemming from character, sentiments, habits, beliefs and
identities.
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In Civics Beyond Critics, MacMullen appears to side with what I have here
called the republican camp, though he does not self-identify as such and he attempts to
create his own theoretical position. On page one he immediately announces his main
question: “would an ideal liberal democratic civic education shape its recipients’ values,
beliefs, preferences, habits, identities, and sentiments? In other words, is character
formation a proper part of civic education in a liberal democracy” (1)? His main
argument is that what he calls the “orthodox view” among political and educational
theorists is mistaken. The part of this view that MacMullen will take issue with in the
remainder of the book states that the “content of civic education should be strictly limited
to avoid compromising its recipient’s ability to think and act as critically autonomous
citizens” (3). MacMullen argues that the orthodox view wrongly prioritizes autonomy
over other (not necessarily liberal) virtues that have traditionally been cultivated by civic
education, chief among which law-abidingness. If we are to achieve the required rate of
compliance for our liberal democratic polities to be stable and flourish, we will, firstly,
have to use education to cultivate nonautonomous motives for compliance (as
autonomous reasoning cannot by itself ensure sufficient compliance). i Secondly, in order
to encourage citizens to contribute voluntarily to the flourishing of their polity, civic
education will need to instill a sense of civic identity. Thirdly, achieving widespread
belief in the merits of the fundamental political institutions of a state calls for a qualified
defense of status quo biased civic education. These three claims correspond to the three
parts the book is made up of.
In part I, MacMullen discusses the first of these three claims. Education for
compliance will need to involve cultivating nonautonomous motives. The orthodox
view’s resistance to such cultivation, MacMullen argues, reflects either a grave
underestimation of the value of widespread compliance with laws or it is indicative of a
“wildly unrealistic faith in the capacity of individuals’ autonomous reasoning to generate
the very high rate of compliance that is morally required in a reasonably just democratic
state” (49). He discusses various strategies that involve molding children’s understanding
of the reasons that ought to guide their behavior in order to ensure widespread
compliance with laws. Of course, the critique is that a society may indeed educate its
citizens successfully to nonautonomously comply with its laws, but that such compliance
has no legitimating force. The orthodoxy would argue that compliance can only be
genuinely legitimating when it is the end result of a process of critical autonomous
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evaluation of the moral demands made of citizens by the law. Shaping citizens’ beliefs,
preferences and habits renders such autonomous deliberation impossible.
MacMullen’s response is, firstly, that the orthodox view “expects people to be
both geniuses and saints” (81). Given its very minimalist approach to civic education, the
orthodox view has to have unrealistically high expectations of both people’s reasoning
abilities and their virtue. But if we wish to attain widespread reliable compliance, civic
education will need to involve more than merely teaching children the basic values
underlying liberal democracy, as the orthodox view proposes. Civic education ought to
involve the fostering of nonautonomous compliance. However, and this is the second part
of MacMullen’s reply to the critique, we ought to be aware of the costs of such civic
education. Authors like William Galston, he says, have lost sight of such costs and go too
far: there is too much character formation and too little consideration for the value of
autonomy. MacMullen, instead, wants to find the “virtuous mean between excessive and
insufficient shaping of character at the expense of autonomy” (33). It is thus by no means
his intention to disregard the value of developing children’s ability to reason critically
and autonomously. He merely rejects the orthodoxy’s claim that autonomy always trumps
all other values. In deciding how to shape our children’s civic education, the development
of autonomous reasoning will have to be weighed against other goods, such as
widespread compliance with laws. If at times promoting compliance through civic
education involves significant costs, we should naturally be sensitive to those costs, but
we should not automatically assume that they are not a price worth paying. On the
contrary, often the costs of moderate and limited deviations from autonomy-maximizing
education are well worth the benefit of drawing closer to the high levels of compliance
required in a liberal democracy. Contrary to the often somewhat polemic rhetoric,
MacMullen thus arrives at what is ultimately a rather modest and very convincing claim.
Ensuring sufficient levels of compliance with laws is only one of a liberal
democracy’s challenges. A healthy political community also requires active civic
engagement (e.g., voting and the performance of other civic duties). There are clear
moral reasons for such civic participation. In particular, MacMullen argues, the
knowledge that democratic polities offer us the best instruments we have for the
realization of a number of particularly valuable goals—such as justice, security, social
coordination and the legitimation of state coercion—should convince us of the moral
necessity to do our part in upholding our democracies’ fundamental institutions.
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Unfortunately, one look at the voter turnout percentages in Western democracies will
show us that we have to do with what MacMullen calls a “civic motivation problem:”
“People’s motives to contribute to the democratic polities of which they are citizens
(and/or residents) are often weaker than the moral reasons for them to do so” (140).
MacMullen suggests that even if we supplement the moral reasons for civic engagement
with reasons of self-interest as well as with certain habits and tastes, most people will still
not be sufficiently and reliably motivated to do their part. Despite the fact that
MacMullen does not provide any argument or empirical proof for this claim, we will
accept it now for the sake of argument, as his solution to the problem—namely, civic
identification—has its own difficulties.
The traditional solution to the remaining civic motivation problem is to rely on
patriotic love. The idea is that if one has affection for one’s polity, one will care about its
wellbeing and so be motivated to contribute to its preservation and flourishing.
MacMullen maintains, however, that cultivating such patriotic love through civic
education is problematic, as such love, firstly, makes one blind to and uncritical of the
faults of one’s polity. Secondly, the manner in which such love is cultivated through
education is problematic as it relies on painting too rosy a picture of the polity and its
history. MacMullen, therefore, proposes an alternative that does not impair civic
judgment as severely as patriotic love does, namely civic identification. There are two
problems with MacMullen’s argument here: firstly, he presents an overly negative view
of patriotic love and, secondly, he offers an overly optimistic understanding of civic
identification. Is it true, to start with the first point, that patriotic love entirely impairs our
critical judgment and amounts to our favoring the status quo in all circumstances (165)?
That simply seems empirically false. Traditionally, civil disobedients as well as
whistleblowers have viewed themselves as true patriots, disobeying for love of country.
Thus Thoreau argued that true patriots for the most part resist the state (Thoreau 1962:
87); Dr. King speaks of breaking the law lovingly (King 1964: 86); Rawls speaks of
demonstrating fidelity to law in civil disobedience (Rawls 1999: 322). It therefore seems
that, typically, civil disobedience is an expression of patriotic love, or at the very least
that it can be.
Furthermore, instilling patriotic love need not necessarily be problematic if we
teach children that true patriots demonstrate their love of country by informing
themselves, by being critical, and by letting their dissenting voices be heard when
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necessary, as a democracy can only thrive if its citizens are willing to act in such a
fashion. Patriotic love need thus by no means be as problematic as MacMullen makes it
out to be.
Regarding the second point, I will merely point out that MacMullen’s positive
appreciation of civic identification relies on the tenuous psychological claim (that he
laboriously develops in chapter 4 but which remains somewhat unconvincing) that civic
identification “has no positive valence to it” (165), that, in other words, identification
with a polity and affection for a polity can be entirely separated. Given that his elaborate
argument for this claim in chapter 4 is unconvincing (and remains entirely theoretical, not
engaging with any empirical studies to support the psychological possibility of such a
separation), and given that a certain qualification of patriotic love can do the work he
wants civic identification to do, he would have been well advised to strike the argument
for civic identification. These objections to the argument for civic identification are
particularly worrying because so much hinges on it: civic identification is presented as
the key to solving the civic motivation problem.
In the third and final part of his book, MacMullen argues for status quo biased
civic education as an “important means by which well-functioning liberal democracies
reproduce themselves” (250). The orthodox view, naturally, argues for bias minimization
in education, as biases would endanger the cultivation of autonomous, critical thought in
our children. Throughout the book, MacMullen has attempted to refute this default
prioritization of autonomy whenever it conflicts with other important values. It is often
perfectly acceptable, MacMullen holds, to sacrifice a measure of autonomy when such
conflicts occur in order to preserve and improve liberal democracy. Nonetheless,
MacMullen argues for only a limited form of status quo educational bias. He rejects a
general status quo educational bias, as it would lead to a favoring of all political
institutions in a particular country. Such an approach would overshoot the mark and
nearly foreclose dissent, even in cases in which it would be fully warranted and desirable.
He prefers particular biases as they allow us to pick and choose which institutions are to
be favored. An example of particular status quo biased education would be to teach
American children to believe jury trials are fairer than inquisitorial ones.
One might object that such status quo bias in civic education will block political
progress. How are we to learn from and amend our mistakes if each generation is taught
to believe in the status quo? MacMullen replies that there must be strong content-
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dependent reasons for status quo bias, i.e., “reasons that invoke widespread beliefs about
the substantive merits of existing institutions” (211). He, furthermore, challenges the
assumption that unbiased education is less likely to lead to false beliefs. What guarantees
are there that the recipients of unbiased education will arrive at sound moral and political
beliefs? Finally, MacMullen partially concedes the point that status quo biased education
may be a (partial) barrier to political progress, but he immediately adds that it is also a
“bulwark against regression” (225). It is in such passages that the decidedly conservative
strain of MacMullen’s project becomes apparent. Political experimentation contains a
risk of losing the valuable institutions that have been built and improved upon over the
course of generations. MacMullen, therefore, approvingly refers to Burke’s appeal to
trust the judgment of our ancestors. A limited form of such “Burkean trust” in the
collective wisdom of previous generations will check the hubris of relying solely upon
one’s own independent judgment. Interestingly enough, this conservatism appears to sit
somewhat uneasily with MacMullen himself, as he feels the need to distance himself
from exceedingly traditional approaches to civic education. What distinguishes his view
from such approaches, he maintains, is his insistence “that civic educational status quo
bias can and should be narrowly targeted in accordance with the criteria” (257) that he
developed earlier on in chapter 7. Still, it is an interesting question, which would have
merited some further elaboration: How conservative is this approach and to what extent
does it clash with the main tenets of liberalism?
At the end of part III, MacMullen returns to the dominant theme of his book: the
rejection of the orthodoxy’s assessment of autonomy as the master value of liberal
democracy. In response to the objection that status quo biased education prevents citizens
from autonomously endorsing their political institutions, MacMullen argues that
autonomy is indeed an extremely important value but that it should not always be
preferred to other important values when these conflict. In conclusion he sums up this
recurring theme of his book as follows:
When the path to maximizing citizens’ autonomy diverges from the
educational measures that are best suited to reproduce and improve
liberal democracy, it is often perfectly appropriate to sacrifice
autonomy to some degree, and there is nothing illiberal or paradoxical
about acknowledging this. (253–54)
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In conclusion, MacMullen has offered a very well worked out and convincing
argument in favor of using civic education in a liberal democracy to shape children’s
values, beliefs, habits and identities. The main thrust of his argument concerns the
rejection of viewing autonomy as the “be-all and end-all” of our normative deliberations.
Autonomy need not always be favored over the competing values of law-abidingness,
civic identification and support for the fundamental political institutions of one’s society.
He convincingly demonstrates that certain educational strategies that may, perhaps
dismissively, be characterized as “conservative” are in fact not only perfectly compatible
with a liberal democracy but are also of indispensable value to its preservation and
flourishing.
Nonetheless, some general critical remarks are in order. Perhaps the main defect
of this work is the absence of any engagement with certain themes that are generally
regarded as central to any discussion of civic education. Questions of republicanism
versus liberalism, or of liberal neutrality versus perfectionism are not dealt with at all in
this work. Perhaps the reason for this is that MacMullen does not want the state to be the
only (or the main? This, too, is unclear) agent involved in educating our children.
Nonetheless, the mentioned discussions seem very pertinent to MacMullen’s topic and
his work would have benefited from an engagement with them. It, furthermore, would
have placed his work in a larger context of scholarly work on the subject, and would have
made clear that many of his positions are, ultimately, not as original as is often suggested
in the book.
Moreover, despite the fact that this work is emphatically a work of philosophy, it
would nevertheless have benefited from some discussion of and engagement with
empirical work on the subject of civic education. Quite often an empirical claim is made
without the empirical data to substantiate it. The reader would like to know, for example,
if pro status quo biased civic education actually results in a, however limited,
diminishment of critical autonomous reasoning. Should this not be the case, the entire
exercise of part III seems moot.
Despite these critical notes, however, MacMullen has succeeded in producing a
work that is not only consistently of the highest academic quality, but that also speaks to
and offers solutions for the extremely relevant problems of free-riding and civic
passivity, so regrettably prevalent in our western democracies today.
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NOTES
1.

It must be mentioned here at the outset that MacMullen has a wide understanding of
the word “education.” Civic education does not only involve schools, but also
parents, media, pop culture and so forth. So his argument for employing civic
education to shape citizens’ characters, preferences and identities does not involve
the further claim that the state ought to be the sole (or even the chief) actor in this.

REFERENCES
King Jr, Martin Luther. (1964). Letter from Birmingham Jail, in Martin Luther King Jr
Why We Can’t Wait (New York: Harper and Row), 77–100.
Rawls, John. (1999). A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press).
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1997). Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its
Projected Reformation, in Victor Gourevitch (ed), Victor Gourevitch (trans) The
Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 177–260.
Thoreau, Henry David. (1962). Civil Disobedience, in Joseph Wood Krutch (ed) Walden
and Other Writings (New York: Bantam Books), 85–104.

